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Abstract—In this paper, we design distributed spectrum access mechanisms with both complete and incomplete network information.
We propose an evolutionary spectrum access mechanism with complete network information, and show that the mechanism achieves
an equilibrium that is globally evolutionarily stable. With incomplete network information, we propose a distributed learning mechanism,
where each user utilizes local observations to estimate the expected throughput and learns to adjust its spectrum access strategy
adaptively over time. We show that the learning mechanism converges to the same evolutionary equilibrium on the time average.
Numerical results show that the proposed mechanisms achieve up to 35% performance improvement over the distributed reinforcement
learning mechanism in the literature, and are robust to the perturbations of users’ channel selections.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, distributed spectrum access, evolutionary games, evolutionarily stable strategy, distributed learning
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio is envisioned as a promising technique
to alleviate the problem of spectrum under-utilization
[1]. It enables unlicensed wireless users (secondary
users) to opportunistically access the licensed channels
owned by spectrum holders (primary users), and thus
can significantly improve the spectrum efficiency [2].
A key challenge of the cognitive radio technology
is how to share the spectrum resources efficiently in
a distributed fashion. A common modeling approach
is to consider selfish secondary users, and model their
interactions as non-cooperative games (e.g., [3]–[8]). Liu
and Wu in [5] modeled the interactions among spatially
separated secondary users as congestion games with
resource reuse. Elias et al. in [6] studied the competitive
spectrum access by multiple interference-sensitive sec-
ondary users. Nie and Comniciu in [7] designed a self-
enforcing distributed spectrum access mechanism based
on potential games. Law et al. in [8] studied the price
of anarchy of spectrum access game, and showed that
users’ selfish choices may significantly degrade system
performance. A common assumption of the above results
is that each user knows the complete network informa-
tion. This is, however, often expensive or infeasible to
achieve due to significant signaling overhead and the
competitiors’ unwillingness to share information.
Another common assumption of all the above work
is that secondary users are fully rational and thus often
adopt their channel selections based on best responses,
i.e., the best choices they can compute by having the
complete network information. To have full rationality, a
user needs to have a high computational power to collect
and analyze the network information in order to predict
other users’ behaviors. This is often not feasible due to
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the limitations of today’s wireless devices.
Another body of related work focused on the de-
sign of spectrum access mechanisms assuming bounded
rationality of secondary users, i.e., each user tries to
improve its strategy adaptively over time. Chen and
Huang in [9] designed an imitation-based spectrum ac-
cess mechanism by letting secondary users imitate other
users’ successful channel selections. When not knowing
the channel selections of other users, secondary users
need to learn the environment and adapt the channel
selection decisions accordingly. Authors in [10], [11] used
no-regret learning to solve this problem, assuming that
the users’ channel selections are common information.
The learning converges to a correlated equilibrium [12],
wherein the common observed history serves as a signal
to coordinate all users’ channel selections. When users’
channel selections are not observable, authors in [13]–
[15] designed multi-agent multi-armed bandit learning
algorithm to minimize the expected performance loss of
distributed spectrum access. Li in [16] applied reinforce-
ment learning to analyze Aloha-type spectrum access.
In this paper, we propose a new framework of dis-
tributed spectrum access with and without complete
network information (i.e., channel statistics and user
selections). The common characteristics of algorithms
under this framework is also bounded rationality, which
requires much less computation power than the full
rationality case, and thus may better match the reality
of wireless communications. We first propose an evolu-
tionary game approach for distributed spectrum access
with the complete network information, where each sec-
ondary user takes a comparison strategy (i.e., comparing
its payoff with the system average payoff) to evolve its
spectrum access decision over time. We then propose
a learning mechanism for distributed spectrum access
with incomplete information, which does not require
any prior knowledge of channel statistics or information
exchange among users. In this case, each secondary user
estimates its expected throughput locally, and learns to
adjust its channel selection strategy adaptively.
2The main results and contributions of this paper are
as follows:
• Evolutionary spectrum access mechanism: we formu-
late the distributed spectrum access over multiple
heterogeneous time-varying licensed channels as an
evolutionary spectrum access game, and study the
evolutionary dynamics of spectrum access.
• Evolutionary dynamics and stability: we show that the
evolutionary spectrum access mechanism converges
to the evolutionary equilibrium, and prove that it is
globally evolutionarily stable.
• Learning mechanism with incomplete information: we
further propose a learning mechanism without the
knowledge of channel statistics and user informa-
tion exchange. We show that the learning mecha-
nism converges to the same evolutionary equilib-
rium on the time average.
• Superior performance: we show that the proposed
mechanisms can achieve up to 35% performance im-
provement over the distributed reinforcement learn-
ing mechanism in literature, and are robust to the
perturbations of users’ channel selections.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We
introduce the system model in Section 2. After briefly
reviewing the evolutionary game theory in Section 3,
we present the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism
with complete information in Section 4. Then we intro-
duce the learning mechanism in Section 5. We illustrate
the performance of the proposed mechanisms through
numerical results in Section 6 and finally conclude in
Section 7.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a cognitive radio network with a set M =
{1, 2, ...,M} of independent and stochastically heteroge-
neous licensed channels. A set N = {1, 2, ..., N} of sec-
ondary users try to opportunistically access these chan-
nels, when the channels are not occupied by primary
(licensed) transmissions. The system model has a slotted
transmission structure as in Figure 1 and is described as
follows.
• Channel State: the channel state for a channel m at
time slot t is
Sm(t) =

0, if channel m is occupied by
primary transmissions,
1, if channel m is idle.
• Channel State Changing: for a channel m, we assume
that the channel state is an i.i.d. Bernoulli random
variable, with an idle probability θm ∈ (0, 1) and
a busy probability 1 − θm. This model can be a
good approximation of the reality if the time slots
for secondary transmissions are sufficiently long or
the primary transmissions are highly bursty [17].
Numerical results show that the proposed mech-
anisms also work well in the Markovian channel
environment.
• Heterogeneous Channel Throughput: if a channel m is
idle, the achievable data rate bm(t) by a secondary
user in each time slot t evolves according to an i.i.d.
random process with a mean Bm, due to the local
environmental effects such fading. For example, in
a frequency-selective Rayleigh fading channel en-
vironment we can compute the channel data rate
according to the Shannon capacity with the channel
gain at a time slot being a realization of a random
variable that follows the exponential distribution
[18].
• Time Slot Structure: each secondary user n executes
the following stages synchronously during each
time slot:
– Channel Sensing: sense one of the channels based
on the channel selection decision generated at
the end of previous time slot. Access the channel
if it is idle.
– Channel Contention: use a backoff mechanism
to resolve collisions when multiple secondary
users access the same idle channel. The con-
tention stage of a time slot is divided into
λmax mini-slots1 (see Figure 1), and user n
executes the following two steps. First, count
down according to a randomly and uniformly
chosen integral backoff time (number of mini-
slots) λn between 1 and λmax. Second, once the
timer expires, transmit RTS/CTS messages if
the channel is clear (i.e., no ongoing transmis-
sion). Note that if multiple users choose the
same backoff value λn, a collision will occur
with RTS/CTS transmissions and no users can
successfully grab the channel.
– Data Transmission: transmit data packets if the
RTS/CTS message exchanges go through and
the user successfully grabs the channel.
– Channel Selection: in the complete information
case, users broadcast the chosen channel IDs
to other users through a common control chan-
nel2, and then make the channel selection deci-
sions based on the evolutionary spectrum access
mechanism (details in Section 4). With incom-
plete information, users update the channel esti-
mations based on the current access results, and
make the channel selection decisions according
to the distributed learning mechanism (details
in Section 5).
Suppose that km users choose an idle channel m to
access. Then the probability that a user n (out of the km
1. For the ease of exposition, we assume that the contention backoff
size λmax is fixed. This corresponds to an equilibrium model for the
case that the backoff size λmax can be dynamically tuned according to
the 802.11 distributed coordination function [19]. Also, we can enhance
the performance of the backoff mechanism by determining optimal
fixed contention backoff size according to the method in [20].
2. Please refer to [21] for the details on how to set up and maintain
a reliable common control channel in cognitive radio networks.
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Fig. 1. Multiple stages in a single time slot.
users) grabs the channel m is
g(km) = Pr{λn < min
i 6=n
{λi}}
=
λmax∑
λ=1
Pr{λn = λ}Pr{λ < min
i 6=n
{λi}|λn = λ}
=
λmax∑
λ=1
1
λmax
(
λmax − λ
λmax
)km−1
,
which is a decreasing function of the number of total
contending users km. Then the expected throughput of
a secondary user n choosing a channel m is given as
Un = θmBmg(km). (1)
For the ease of exposition, we will focus on the
analysis of the proposed spectrum access mechanisms
in the many-users regime. Numerical results show that
our algorithms also apply when the number of users is
small (see Section 6.3 for the details). Since our analysis
is from secondary users’ perspective, we will use terms
“secondary user” and “user” interchangeably.
3 OVERVIEW OF EVOLUTIONARY GAME THE-
ORY
For the sake of completeness, we will briefly describe
the background of evolutionary game theory. Detailed
introduction can be found in [22]. Evolutionary game
theory was first used in biology to study the change
of animal populations, and then later applied in eco-
nomics to model human behaviors. It is most useful to
understand how a large population of users converge to
Nash equilibria in a dynamic system [22]. A player in an
evolutionary game has bounded rationality, i.e., limited
computational capability and knowledge, and improves
its decisions as it learns about the environment over time
[22].
3.1 Replicator Dynamics
As mentioned, the evolutionary game theory was first
proposed in Biology to study the interactive behaviors
among a population of animals [22]. The game consists
of animals (players) using different strategies. The strat-
egy of an animal is inherited by its offsprings. Animals
with higher fitness will leave more offsprings, so in the
next generation the composition of the population will
change. Such a reproduction process can be modeled by
a set of differential equations called replicator dynamics.
Formally, a player in the population chooses a strategy
i from a finite set of strategies I = {1, ...I}. The popula-
tion state x(t) = (x1(t), ..., xI(t)) describes the dynamics
of the reproduction process, with xi(t) denoting the
proportion of players in the population adopting the
strategy i at time t. The replicator dynamics are then
given by
x˙i(t) = β (R(i,x(t))−R(x(t))) ,∀i ∈ I, (2)
where R(i,x(t)) is the payoff of the players choosing
strategy i, R(x(t)) is the average payoff of the popu-
lation, and β > 0 is the rate of strategy adaptation.
It means that the strategy that works better than the
average will be promoted.
3.2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
The evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept
to describe the evolutionary equilibrium. For simplicity,
we will introduce the ESS definition (the strict Nash
equilibrium in Definition 2, respectively) in the context
of a symmetric game where all users adopt the same
strategy i at the ESS (strict Nash equilibrium, respec-
tively). The definition can be (and will be) extended to
the case of asymmetric game [22], where we view the
population’s collective behavior as a mixed strategy i at
the ESS (strict Nash equilibrium, respectively).
An ESS ensures the stability such that the popula-
tion is robust to perturbations by a small fraction of
players. Suppose that a small share  of players in
the population deviate to choose a mutant strategy j,
while all other players stick to the incumbent strat-
egy i. We denote the population state of the game as
x(1−)i+j = (xi = 1− , xj = , xl = 0,∀l 6= i, j), where
xa denotes the fraction of users choosing strategy a,
and the corresponding payoff of choosing strategy a as
R(a,x(1−)i+j).
Definition 1 ([22]). A strategy i is an evolutionarily stable
strategy if for every strategy j 6= i, there exists an ¯ ∈ (0, 1)
such that R(i,xj+(1−)i) > R(j,xj+(1−)i) for any j 6= i
and  ∈ (0, ¯).
Definition 1 means that the mutant strategy j cannot
invade the population when the perturbation is small
enough, if the incumbent strategy i is an ESS. It is shown
in [22] that any strict Nash equilibrium in noncoopera-
tive games is also an ESS.
Definition 2 ([22]). A strategy i is a strict Nash equilib-
rium if for every strategy j 6= i, it satisfies that R(i, i, ..., i) >
R(j, i, ..., i), where R(a, i, ..., i) denotes the payoff of choosing
strategy a ∈ {i, j} given other players adhering to the strategy
i.
To understand that a strict Nash is an ESS, we can
set  → 0 in Definition 1, which leads to R(i,xi) >
R(j,xi),∀j 6= i, i.e., given that almost all other players
play the incumbent strategy i, choosing any mutant
strategy j 6= i will lead to a loss in payoff.
4Algorithm 1 Evolutionary Spectrum Access Mechanism
1: initialization:
2: set the global strategy adaptation factor α ∈ (0, 1].
3: select a random channel for each user.
4: end initialization
5: loop for each time slot t and each user n ∈ N in
parallel:
6: sense and contend for the chosen channel and
transmit data packets if successfully grabbing the
channel.
7: broadcast the chosen channel ID to other users
through a common control channel.
8: receive the information of other users’ channel
selection and calculate the population state x(t).
9: compute the expected payoff Un(an,x(t)) and the
system average payoff U(x(t)) according to (3) and
(4), respectively.
10: if Un(an,x(t)) < U(x(t)) then
11: generate a random value δ according to a
uniform distribution on (0, 1).
12: if δ < αxan (t)
(
1− Un(an,x(t))U(x(t))
)
then
13: select a new channel m with probability
pm =
max {θmBmg(Nxm(t))− U(x(t)), 0}∑M
m′=1 max {θm′Bm′g(Nxm′(t))− U(x(t)), 0}
.
14: else select the original channel.
15: end if
16: end if
17: end loop
Several recent results applied the evolutionary game
theory to study various networking problems. Niyato
and Hossain in [17] investigated the evolutionary dy-
namics of heterogeneous network selections. Zhang et
al. in [23] designed incentive schemes for resource-
sharing in P2P networks based on the evolutionary game
theory. Wang et al. in [24] proposed the evolutionary
game approach for collaborative spectrum sensing mech-
anism design in cognitive radio networks. According
to Definition 1, the ESS obtained in [17], [23], [24] is
locally evolutionarily stable (i.e., the mutation  is small
enough). Here we apply the evolutionary game theory to
design spectrum access mechanism, which can achieve
global evolutionary stability (i.e., the mutation  can be
arbitrarily large).
4 EVOLUTIONARY SPECTRUM ACCESS
We now apply the evolutionary game theory to design
an efficient and stable spectrum access mechanism with
complete network information. We will show that the
spectrum access equilibrium is an ESS, which guarantees
that the spectrum access mechanism is robust to random
perturbations of users’ channel selections.
4.1 Evolutionary Game Formulation
The evolutionary spectrum access game is formulated as
follows:
• Players: the set of users N = {1, 2, ..., N}.
• Strategies: each user can access one of the set of
channels M = {1, 2, ...,M}.
• Population state: the user distribution over M chan-
nels at time t, x(t) = (xm(t),∀m ∈M), where xm(t)
is the proportion of users selecting channel m at
time t. We have
∑
m∈M xm(t) = 1 for all t.
• Payoff: a user n’s expected throughput Un(an,x(t))
when choosing channel an ∈ M, given that the
population state is x(t). Since each user has the
information of channel statistics, from (1), we have
Un(an,x(t)) = θanBang(Nxan(t)). (3)
We also denote the system arithmetic average payoff
under population state x(t) as
U(x(t)) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
θmBmg(Nxm(t)). (4)
4.2 Evolutionary Dynamics
Based on the evolutionary game formulation above, we
propose an evolutionary spectrum access mechanism
in Algorithm 1 by reversing-engineering the replicator
dynamics. The idea is to let those users who have payoffs
lower than the system average payoff U(x(t) to select
a better channel, with a probability proportional to the
(normalized) channel’s “net fitness” θmBmg(Nxm(t)) −
U(x(t)). We show that the dynamics of channel se-
lections in the mechanism can be described with the
evolutionary dynamics in (5). The proof is given in the
sperate Appendix file.
Theorem 1. For the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism
in Algorithm 1, the evolutionary dynamics are given as
x˙m(t) = α
(
Un(m,x(t))
U(x(t))
− 1
)
,∀m ∈M, (5)
where the derivative is with respect to time t.
4.3 Evolutionary Equilibrium in Asymptotic Case
λmax =∞
We next investigate the equilibrium of the evolutionary
spectrum access mechanism. To obtain useful insights,
we first focus on the asymptotic case where the number
of backoff mini-slots λmax goes to ∞, such that
g(k) = lim
λmax→∞
λmax∑
λ=1
1
λmax
(
λmax − λ
λmax
)k−1
= lim
1
λmax
→0
λmax−1∑
λ=0
(
λ
λmax
)k−1
1
λmax
=
∫ 1
0
zk−1dz =
1
k
. (6)
5This is a good approximation when the number of
mini-slots λmax for backoff is much larger than the
number of users N and collisions rarely occur. In this
case, Un(an,x(t)) =
θanBan
Nxm(t)
and U(x(t)) =
∑M
i=1 θiBi
N .
According to Theorem 1, the evolutionary dynamics in
(5) become
x˙m(t) = α
(
θmBm
xm(t)
1
M
∑M
i=1
θiBi
xi(t)
− 1
)
. (7)
From (7), we have
Theorem 2. The evolutionary spectrum access mechanism
in asymptotic case λmax = ∞ globally converges to the
evolutionary equilibrium x∗ =
(
x∗m =
θmBm∑M
i=1 θiBi
,∀m ∈M
)
.
The proof is given in the sperate Appendix file. The-
orem 2 implies that
Corollary 1. The evolutionary spectrum access mechanism
converges to the equilibrium x∗ such that users on different
channels achieve the same expected throughput, i.e.,
Un(m,x
∗) = Un(m′,x∗),∀m,m′ ∈M. (8)
We next show that for the general case λmax < ∞,
the evolutionary dynamics also globally converges to the
ESS equilibrium as given in (8).
4.4 Evolutionary Equilibrium in General Case
λmax <∞
For the general case λmax, since the channel grabbing
probability g(k) does not have the close-form expression,
it is hence difficult to obtain the equilibrium solution
of differential equations in (5). However, it is easy to
verify that the equilibrium x∗ in (8) is also a stationary
point such that the evolutionary dynamics (5) in the
general case λmax < ∞ satisfy x˙m(t) = 0. Thus, at the
equilibrium x∗, users on different channels achieve the
same expected throughput.
We now study the evolutionary stability of the equi-
librium. In general, the equilibrium of the replicator
dynamics may not be an ESS [22]. For our model, we
can prove the following.
Theorem 3. For the evolutionary spectrum access mecha-
nism, the evolutionary equilibrium x∗ in (8) is an ESS.
The proof is given in Section 8.1. Actually we can
obtain a stronger result than Theorem 3. Typically, an
ESS is only locally asymptotically stable (i.e., stable
within a limited region around the ESS) [22]. For our
case, we show that the evolutionary equilibrium x∗ is
globally asymptotically stable (i.e., stable in the entire
feasible region of a population state x, {x = (xm,m ∈
M)|∑Mm=1 xm = 1 and xm ≥ 0,∀m ∈M}).
To proceed, we first define the following function
L(x) =
M∑
m=1
∫ xm
−∞
θmBmg(Nz)dz. (9)
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Fig. 2. Learning time structure
Since g(·) is a decreasing function, it is easy to check
that the Hessian matrix of L(x) is negative definite. It
follows that L(x) is strictly concave and hence has a
unique global maximum L∗. By the first order condition,
we obtain the optimal solution x∗, which is the same as
the evolutionary equilibrium x∗ in (8). Then by showing
that V (x(t)) = L∗−L(x(t)) is a strict Lyapunov function,
we have
Theorem 4. For the evolutionary spectrum access mech-
anism, the evolutionary equilibrium x∗ in (8) is globally
asymptotically stable.
The proof is given in the sperate Appendix file. Since
the ESS is globally asymptotically stable, the evolu-
tionary spectrum access mechanism is robust to any
degree of (not necessarily small) random perturbations
of channel selections.
5 LEARNING MECHANISM FOR DISTRIBUTED
SPECTRUM ACCESS
For the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism in
Section 4, we assume that each user has the perfect
knowledge of channel statistics and the population state
by information exchange on a common control chan-
nel. Such mechanism leads to significant communication
overhead and energy consumption, and may even be
impossible in some systems. We thus propose a learning
mechanism for distributed spectrum access with incom-
plete information. The challenge is how to achieve the
evolutionarily stable state based on user’s local observa-
tions only.
5.1 Learning Mechanism For Distributed Spectrum
Access
The proposed learning process is shown in Algorithm 2
and has two sequential stages: initial channel estimation
(line 5 to 10) and access strategy learning (line 11 to 15).
Each stage is defined over a sequence of decision periods
T = 1, 2, ..., where each decision period consists of tmax
time slots (see Figure 2 as an illustration).
The key idea of distributed learning here is to adapt
each user’s spectrum access decision based on its accu-
mulated experiences. In the first stage, each user initially
estimates the expected throughput by accessing all the
channels in a randomized round-robin manner. This
ensures that all users do not choose the same channel
at the same period. LetMn (equals to ∅ initially) be the
6Algorithm 2 Learning Mechanism For Distributed Spec-
trum Access
1: initialization:
2: set the global memory weight γ ∈ (0, 1) and the
set of accessed channels Mn = ∅ for each user n.
3: end initialization
4: loop for each user n ∈ N in parallel:
. Initial Channel Estimation Stage
5: while Mn 6=M do
6: choose a channel m from the set Mcn ran-
domly.
7: sense and contend to access the channel m at
each time slot of the decision period.
8: estimate the expected throughput U˜m,n(0) by
(10).
9: set Mn =Mn ∪ {m}.
10: end while
. Access Strategy Learning Stage
11: for for each time period T do
12: choose a channel m to access according to the
mixed strategy fn(T ) in (11).
13: sense and contend to access the channel m at
each time slot of the decision period.
14: estimate the qualities of the chosen channel m
and the unchosen channels m′ 6= m by (13) and (12),
respectively.
15: end for
16: end loop
set of channels accessed by user n and Mcn = M\Mn.
At beginning of each decision period, user n randomly
chooses a channel m ∈ Mcn (i.e., a channel that has not
been accessed before) to access. At end of the period,
user n can estimate the expected throughput by sample
averaging as
Zm,n(0) = (1− γ)
∑tmax
t=1 bm(t)I{an(t,T )=m}
tmax
, (10)
where 0 < γ < 1 is called the memory weight and
I{an(t,T )=m} is an indicator function and equals 1 if the
channel m is idle at time slot t and the user n chooses
and successfully grabs the channel m. Motivation of
multiplying (1 − γ) in (10) is to scale down the impact
of the noisy instantaneous estimation on the learning.
Note that there are tmax time slots within each decision
period, and thus the user will be able to have a fairly
good estimation of the expected throughput if tmax is
reasonably large. Then user n updates the set of accessed
channels as Mn = Mn ∪ {m}. When all the channels
are accessed, i.e., Mn = M, the stage of initial channel
estimation ends. Thus, the total time slots for the first
stage is Mtmax.
In the second stage, at each period T ≥ 1, each user
n ∈ N selects a channel m to access according to a mixed
strategy fn(T ) = (f1,n(T ), ..., fM,n(T )), where fm,n(T )
is the probability of user n choosing channel m and is
computed as
fm,n(T ) =
∑T−1
τ=0 γ
T−τ−1Zm,n(τ)∑M
i=1
∑T−1
τ=0 γ
T−τ−1Zi,n(τ)
,∀m ∈M. (11)
Here Zm,n(τ) is user n’s estimation of the quality of
channel m at period τ (see (12) and(13) later). The update
in (11) means that each user adjusts its mixed strategy
according to its weighted average estimations of all
channels’ qualities.
Suppose that user n chooses channel m to access at
period τ . For the unchosen channels m′ 6= m at this
period, user n can empirically estimate the quality of
this channel according to its past memories as
Zm′,n(τ) = (1− γ)
τ−1∑
τ ′=0
γτ−τ
′−1Zm′,n(τ
′
). (12)
For the chosen channel m, user n will update the es-
timation of this channel m by combining the empirical
estimation with the real-time throughput measurement
in this period, i.e.,
Zm,n(τ) =(1− γ)
 τ−1∑
τ ′=0
γτ−τ
′−1Zm,n(τ
′
)
+
∑tmax
t=1 bm(t)I{an(t,τ)=m}
tmax
)
. (13)
5.2 Convergence of Learning Mechanism
We now study the convergence of the learning mecha-
nism. Since each user only utilizes its local estimation to
adjust its mixed channel access strategy, the exact ESS is
difficult to achieve due to the random estimation noise.
We will show that the learning mechanism can converge
to the ESS on time average.
According to the theory of stochastic approximation
[25], the limiting behaviors of the learning mechanism
with the random estimation noise can be well approx-
imated by the corresponding mean dynamics. We thus
study the mean dynamics of the learning mechanism.
To proceed, we define the mapping from the mixed
channel access strategies f(T ) = (f1(T ), ...,fN (T )) to
the mean throughput of user n choosing channel m as
Qm,n(f(T )) , E[Un(m,x(T ))|f(T )]. Here the expecta-
tion E[·] is taken with respective to the mixed strategies
f(T ) of all users. We show that
Theorem 5. As the memory weight γ → 1, the mean
dynamics of the learning mechanism for distributed spectrum
access are given as (∀m ∈M, n ∈ N )
f˙m,n(T ) = fm,n(T )
(
Qm,n(f(T ))−
M∑
i=1
fi,n(T )Qi,n(f(T ))
)
,
(14)
7where the derivative is with respect to period T .
The proof is given in Section 8.2. Interestingly, simi-
larly with the evolutionary dynamics in (5), the learn-
ing dynamics in (14) imply that if a channel offers a
higher throughput for a user than the user’s average
throughput over all channels, then the user will exploit
that channel more often in the future learning. How-
ever, the evolutionary dynamics in (5) are based on the
population level with complete network information,
while the learning dynamics in (14) are derived from the
individual local estimations. We show in Theorem 6 that
the mean dynamics of learning mechanism converge to
the ESS in (8), i.e., Qm,n(f∗) = Qm′,n(f∗).
Theorem 6. As the memory weight γ → 1, the mean
dynamics of the learning mechanism for distributed spectrum
access asymptotically converge to a limiting point f∗ such
that
Qm,n(f
∗) = Qm′,n(f∗),∀m,m′ ∈M,∀n ∈ N . (15)
The proof is given in Section 8.3. Since
Qm,n(f
∗) = E[Un(m,x(T ))|f∗] and the mean dynamics
converge to the equilibrium f∗ satisfying (15) (i.e.,
E[Un(m,x(T ))|f∗] = E[Un(m′,x(T ))|f∗]), the learning
mechanism thus converges to the ESS (8) (achieved
by the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism) on
the time average. Note that both the evolutionary
spectrum access mechanism in Algorithm 1 and
learning mechanism in Algorithm 2 involve basic
arithmetic operations and random number generation
over M channels, and hence have a linear computational
complexity of O(M) for each iteration. However, due
to the incomplete information, the learning mechanism
typically takes a longer convergence time in order to
get a good estimation of the environment.
6 SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the proposed algorithms
by simulations. We consider a cognitive radio network
consisting M = 5 Rayleigh fading channels. The channel
idle probabilities are {θm}Mm=1 = { 23 , 47 , 59 , 12 , 45}. The data
rate on a channel m is computed according to the
Shannon capacity, i.e., bm = ζm log2(1+
Pnhm
N0
), where ζm
is the bandwidth of channel m, Pn is the power adopted
by users, N0 is the noise power, and hm is the channel
gain (a realization of a random variable that follows
the exponential distribution with the mean h¯m). In the
following simulations, we set ζm = 10 MHz, N0 = −100
dBm, and Pn = 100 mW. By choosing different mean
channel gain h¯m, we have different mean data rates
Bm = E[bm], which equal 15, 70, 90, 20 and 100 Mbps,
respectively.
6.1 Evolutionary Spectrum Access in Large User
Population Case
We first study the evolutionary spectrum mechanism
with complete network information in Section 4 with a
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Fig. 3. The iterations need for the convergence of the evo-
lutionary spectrum accessing mechanism with different
choices of strategy adaptation factor α. The confidence
interval is 95%.
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Fig. 4. The fraction of users on each channel and the
expected user payoff of accessing different channels with
the number of users N = 100 and 200, respectively, and
the number of backoff mini-slots λmax = 100000.
large user population. We found that the convergence
speed of the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism
increases as the strategy adaptation factor α increases
(see Figure 3). We set the strategy adaptation factor
α = 0.5 in the following simulations in order to better
demonstrate the evolutionary dynamics. We implement
the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism with the
number of users N = 100 and 200, respectively, in both
large and small λmax cases.
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Fig. 5. Stability of the evolutionary spectrum access
mechanism. Fraction of users in total N = 200 users who
choose mutant channels randomly at time slot 30 equal to
0.5 and 0.9, respectively, and the number of backoff mini-
slots λmax = 100000.
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Fig. 6. The fraction of users on each channel and the
expected user payoff of accessing different channels with
the number of users N = 100 and 200, respectively, and
the number of backoff mini-slots λmax = 20.
6.1.1 Large λmax Case
We first consider the case that the number of backoff
mini-slots λmax = 100000, which is much larger that
the number of users N and thus collisions in channel
contention rarely occur. This case can be approximated
by the asymptotic case λmax = ∞ in Section 4.3. The
simulation results are shown in Figures 4 and 5. From
these figures, we see that
• Fast convergence: the algorithm takes less than 20
iterations to converge in all cases (see Figure 4).
• Convergence to ESS: in both N = 100 and 200
cases, the algorithm converges to the ESS x∗ =
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Fig. 7. Stability of the evolutionary spectrum access
mechanism. Fraction of users in total N = 200 users who
choose mutant channels randomly at time slot 30 equal to
0.5 and 0.9, respectively, and the number of backoff mini-
slots λmax = 20.
(
θ1B1∑M
i=1 θiBi
, ..., θMBM∑M
i=1 θiBi
)
(see Figure the left column
of 4). At the ESS x∗, each user achieves the same
expected payoff Un(a∗n,x∗) =
∑M
i=1 θiBi
N (see the right
column of Figure 4).
• Asymptotic stability: to investigate the stability of the
evolutionary spectrum access mechanism, we let a
fraction of users play the mutant strategies when the
system is at the ESS x∗. At time slot t = 30,  = 0.5
and 0.9 fraction of users will randomly choose a new
channel. The result is shown in Figure 5. We see
that the algorithm is capable to recover the ESS x∗
quickly after the mutation occurs. This demonstrates
that the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism is
robust to the perturbations in the network.
6.1.2 Small λmax Case
We now consider the case that the number of backoff
mini-slots λmax = 20, which is smaller than the number
of users N . In this case, severe collisions in channel
contention may occur and hence lead to a reduction in
data rates for all users. The results are shown in Figures 6
and 7. We see that a small λmax leads to a system perfor-
mance loss (i.e.,
∑N
n=1 Un(an(T ),x(T )) <
∑M
m=1 θmBm),
due to severe collisions in channel contention. How-
ever, the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism still
quickly converges to the ESS as given in (8) such that
all users achieve the same expected throughput, and the
asymptotic stable property also holds. This verifies the
efficiency of the mechanism in the small λmax case.
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Fig. 8. Learning mechanism for distributed spectrum
access with the number of users N = 100 and 200,
respectively, and the number of backoff mini-slots λmax =
100000.
6.2 Distributed Learning Mechanism in Large User
Population Case
We next evaluate the learning mechanism for distributed
spectrum access with a large user population. We imple-
ment the learning mechanism with the number of users
N = 100 and N = 200, respectively, in both large and
small λmax cases. We set the memory factor γ = 0.99
and the length of a decision period tmax = 100 time
slots, which provides a good estimation of the mean
data rate. Figures 8 and 9 show the time average user
distribution on the channels converges to the ESS, and
the time average user’s payoff converges the expected
payoff at the ESS. Note that users achieve this result
without prior knowledge of the statistics of the channels,
and the number of users utilizing each channel keeps
changing in the learning scheme.
6.3 Evolutionary Spectrum Access and Distributed
Learning in Small User Population Case
We then consider the case that the user population N
is small. We implement the proposed evolutionary spec-
trum access mechanism and distributed learning mech-
anism with the number of users N = 4 and the number
of backoff mini-slots λmax = 20. The results are shown
in Figure 10. We see that the evolutionary spectrum
access mechanism converges to the equilibrium such that
channel 5 has 2 users and both channel 1 and 2 have
1 user. These 4 users achieve the expected throughput
equal to 50, 40, 38 and 38 Mbps, respectively, at the
equilibrium. It is easy to check that any user unilaterally
changes its channel selection at the equilibrium will lead
to a loss in throughput, hence the equilibrium is a strict
Nash equilibrium. According to [22], any strict Nash
equilibrium is also an ESS and hence the convergent
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Fig. 9. Learning mechanism for distributed spectrum
access with the number of users N = 100 and 200,
respectively, and the number of backoff mini-slots λmax =
20.
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Fig. 10. Evolutionary spectrum access and Learning
mechanism for distributed spectrum access with the num-
ber of users N = 4, and the number of backoff mini-slots
λmax = 20.
equilibrium is an ESS. For the distributed learning mech-
anism, we see that the mechanism also converges to the
same equilibrium on the time average. This verifies that
effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms in the small
user population case.
6.4 Performance Comparison
To benchmark the performance of the proposed mecha-
nisms, we compare them with the following two algo-
rithms:
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• Centralized optimization: we solve the centralized op-
timization problem maxx
∑N
n=1 Un(an,x), i.e., find
the optimal population state xopt that maximizes the
system throughput.
• Distributed reinforcement learning: we also implement
the distributed algorithm in [16] by generalizing
the single-agent reinforcement learning to the multi-
agent setting. More specifically, each user n main-
tains a perception value Pnm(T ) to describe the per-
formance of channel m, and select the channel m
with the probability fm,n(T ) = e
νPnm(T )∑M
m′=1 e
νPn
m′ (T )
where
ν is called the temperature. Once a payoff Un(T )
is received, user n updates the perception value as
Pnm(T + 1) = (1 − µT )Pnm(T ) + µTUn(T )I{an(T )=m}
where µT is the smooth factor satisfying
∑∞
T=1 µT =
∞ and ∑∞T=1 µ2T < ∞. As shown in [16], when ν
is sufficiently large, the algorithm converges to a
stationary point. We hence set µT = 100T and ν = 10
in the simulation, which guarantees the convergence
and achieves a good system performance.
Since the proposed learning mechanism in this paper
can converge to the same equilibrium as the evolutionary
spectrum access mechanism, we only implement the
evolutionary spectrum access mechanism in this exper-
iment. The results are shown in Figure 11. Since the
global optimum by centralized optimization and the ESS
by evolutionary spectrum access are deterministic, only
the confidence interval of the distributed reinforcement
learning is shown here. We see that the evolutionary
spectrum access mechanism achieves up to 35% perfor-
mance improvement over the distributed reinforcement
learning algorithm. Compared with the centralized op-
timization approach, the performance loss of the evo-
lutionary spectrum access mechanism is at most 38%.
When the number of users N is small (e.g., N ≤ 50),
the performance loss can be further reduced to less than
25%. Note that the solution by the centralized optimiza-
tion is not incentive compatible, since it is not a Nash
equilibrium and user can improve its payoff by changing
its channel selection unilaterally. While the evolutionary
spectrum access mechanism achieves an ESS, which is
also a (strict) Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable.
Interestingly, the curve of the evolutionary spectrum
access mechanism in Figure 11 achieves a local minimum
when the number of users N = 5. This can be interpreted
by the property of the Nash equilibrium. When the num-
ber of users N = 4, these four users will utilize the three
channels with high data rate (i.e., Channel 2, 3, and 5 in
the simulation). When the number of users N = 5, the
same three channels are utilized at the Nash equilibrium.
In this case, there will be a system performance loss
due to severer channel contention. However, no user at
the equilibrium is willing to switch to another vacant
channel, since the remaining vacant channels have low
data rates and such a switch will incurs a loss to the user.
When the number of users N = 8, all given channels are
utilized at the Nash equilibrium, and this improves the
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Fig. 11. Comparison of the evolutionary spectrum access
mechanism with the distributed reinforcement learning
and centralized optimization. The confidence interval is
95%.
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Fig. 12. Two states Markovian channel model
system performance.
6.5 Distributed Learning Mechanism In Markovian
Channel Environment
For the ease of exposition, we have considered the i.i.d.
channel model as far. We now consider the proposed
mechanisms in the Markovian channel environment.
Since in the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism
each user has the complete information aprior (including
the stationary distribution that a channel is idle), the
Markovian setting will not affect the evolutionary spec-
trum access mechanism. We hence focus on evaluating
the learning mechanism.
We consider a network of N = 100 users and M =
10 channels. The states of channels change according to
independent Markovian processes (see Figure 12). We
denote the channel state probability vector of channel
m at time slot t as pm(t) , (Pr{Sm(t) = 0, P r{Sm(t) =
1}}), which follows a two state Markov chain as pm(t) =
pm(t− 1)Γ,∀t ≥ 1, with the transition matrix
Γ =
[
1− p p
q 1− q
]
.
For the simulation, we set p = q = , where  is called
the dynamic factor. A larger  means that the channel
11
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Fig. 13. Distributed learning mechanism with different
memory weights γ
state changes faster over time. The mean data rates Bm
of 10 channels are 10, 40, 50, 20, 80, 60, 15, 25, 30, and 70
Mbps, respectively.
We first set the dynamic factor  = 0.3, and study the
learning mechanism with the different memory weights
γ = 0.99, 0.8, 0.5, and 0.1, respectively. The results are
shown in Figure 13. We see that a large enough memory
weight (e.g., γ ≥ 0.8) is needed to guarantee that the
mechanism converges to the ESS equilibrium. When the
memory weight is large, the noise of the local estimation
by each user can be averaged out in the long run, and
hence each user can achieve an accurate estimation of
the environment. When the memory weight is small, the
most recent estimations will have a great impact on the
learning. This means that the learning mechanism will
over-exploit the current best channels, and get stuck in
a local optimum.
We next set the memory weight γ = 0.99, and
investigate the learning mechanism in the Markovian
channel environments with different dynamic factors
 = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7, respectively. The results are
shown in Figure 14. We see that the learning mechanism
can converge to the ESS in all cases. This demonstrates
that the learning mechanism is robust to the dynamic
channel state changing.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the problem of distributed spec-
trum access of multiple time-varying heterogeneous li-
censed channels, and propose an evolutionary spectrum
access mechanism based on evolutionary game theory.
We show that the equilibrium of the mechanism is an
evolutionarily stable strategy and is globally stable. We
further propose a learning mechanism, which requires
no information exchange among the users. We show that
the learning mechanism converges to the evolutionarily
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Fig. 14. Distributed learning mechanism with the memory
weight γ = 0.99 in the Markovian channel environment
with different dynamic factors 
stable strategy on the time average. Numerical results
show that the proposed mechanisms can achieve efficient
and stable spectrum sharing among the users.
One possible direction of extending this result is to
consider heterogeneous users, i.e. each user may achieve
different mean data rates on the same channel. Another
interesting direction is to take the spatial reuse effect into
account. How to design an efficient evolutionarily stable
spectrum access mechanism with spatial reuse will be
challenging.
8 PROOFS
8.1 Proof of Theorem 3
We first show that the solution in (8) is an equilibrium
for the evolution dynamics in (5). Since Un(m,x∗) =
Un(m
′,x∗) for any m,m′ ∈ M, it follows that U(x∗) =
1
M
∑M
i=1 Un(i,x
∗) = Un(m,x∗) for any m ∈ M. Hence
x˙m = α(
Un(m,x
∗)
U(x∗) − 1) = 0, which is an equilibrium for
the evolution dynamics in (5).
We next show that the equilibrium x∗ is a strict
Nash equilibrium. The expected payoff of a user
n ∈ N at the equilibrium population state x∗ is
given by Un(a∗n,x∗) = θa∗nBa∗ng(Nx
∗
a∗n
), where a∗n
is the channel chosen by user n in the population
state x∗. Now suppose that user n makes an unilat-
eral deviation to another channel an 6= a∗n, and the
population state becomes x′ = (x∗1, ..., x∗a∗n−1, x
∗
a∗n
−
1
N , x
∗
a∗n+1
, ..., x∗an−1, x
∗
an +
1
N , x
∗
an+1, ..., x
∗
N ). Then its ex-
pected payoff becomes Un(an,x′) = θanBang(Nx∗an +
1) < θanBang(Nx
∗
an). For the equilibrium x
∗, we
have θa∗nBa∗ng(Nx
∗
a∗n
) = θanBang(Nx
∗
an). It follows that
Un(a
∗
n,x
∗) > Un(an,x′),∀an 6= a∗n, n ∈ N , which is a
strict Nash equilibrium.
12
8.2 Proof of Theorem 5
The key idea of the proof is to first obtain the discrete
time dynamics of the learning mechanism, and then de-
rive the corresponding mean continuous time dynamics.
For simplicity, we first define that
Am,n(T ) =
T−1∑
τ=0
γT−τ−1Zm,n(τ)
and
Cn(T ) =
∑tmax
t=1 bi(t)I{an(t,T )=an(T )}
tmax
,
where I{an(t,T )=an(T )} indicates whether user n success-
fully grabs the chosen channel an(T ), and hence Cn(T )
denotes the average throughput it received at period T .
According to (12) and (13), we have
Am,n(T + 1) = Zm,n(T ) + γ
T−1∑
τ=0
γT−τ−1Zm,n(τ)
=(1− γ)Cn(T )I{an(T )=m} + (1− γ)
T−1∑
τ=0
γT−τ−1Zm,n(τ)
+ γ
T−1∑
τ=0
γT−τ−1Zm,n(τ)
=(1− γ)Cn(T )I{an(T )=m} +
T−1∑
τ=0
γT−τ−1Zm,n(τ)
=(1− γ)Cn(T )I{an(T )=m} +Am,n(T ),
where I{an(T )=m} indicates whether user n chooses chan-
nel m in period T . Then the mixed strategy update in
(11) becomes
fm,n(T + 1) =
Am,n(T + 1)∑M
i=1Ai,n(T + 1)
=
Am,n(T ) + (1− γ)Cn(T )I{an(T )=m}∑M
i=1Ai,n(T ) + (1− γ)Cn(T )
,
For the chosen channel j (i.e., I{an(T )=j} = 1), we further
have
fj,n(T + 1) =
Aj,n(T )∑M
i=1Ai,n(T ) + (1− γ)Cn(T )
(16)
+
(1− γ)Cn(T )∑M
i=1Ai,n(T ) + (1− γ)Cn(T )
=
Aj,n(T )∑M
i=1Ai,n(T )
∑M
i=1Ai,n(T )∑M
i=1Ai,n(T ) + (1− γ)Cn(T )
+
(1− γ)Cn(T )∑M
i=1Ai,n(T ) + (1− γ)Cn(T )
=fj,n(T )
(
1− (1− γ)Cn(T )∑M
i=1Ai,n(T ) + (1− γ)Cn(T )
)
+
(1− γ)Cn(T )∑M
i=1Ai,n(T ) + (1− γ)Cn(T )
. (17)
Let β(T ) = (1−γ)∑M
i=1 Ai,n(T )+(1−γ)Cn(T )
, and (17) can be
expresses as
fj,n(T + 1) = fj,n(T )(1−β(T )Cn(T )) +β(T )Cn(T ). (18)
Similarly, for the unchosen channel j′(i.e., I{an(T )=j′} =
0), we have
fj′,n(T + 1) = fj′,n(T )(1− β(T )Cn(T )). (19)
According to (18) and (19), we thus obtain the discrete
time learning dynamics as
fm,n(T + 1)− fm,n(T ) = β(T )Cn(T )(I{an(T )=m} − fm,n(T )).
(20)
Since β(T ) → 0 as γ → 1, by the theory of stochastic
approximation (Theorem 3.2) in [25], the limiting behav-
ior of the stochastic difference equations in (20) is the
same as its mean continuous time dynamics by taking
the expectation on RHS of (20) with respective to f(T ),
i.e.,
f˙m,n(T ) = E[Cn(T )(I{an(T )=m} − fm,n(T ))|f(T )]
=(1− fm,n(T ))E[Cn(T )|an(t) = m,f(T )]fm,n(T )
− fm,n(T )
∑
i 6=m
E[Cn(T )|an(t) = i,f(T )]fi,n(T ). (21)
Since Cn(T ) is the sample averaging estimation of the
expected throughput of the chosen channel, by the cen-
tral limit theorem, we have E[Cn(T )|an(t) = m,f(T )] =
E[Un(an(t) = m,x(T ))|f(T )] = Qm,n(f(T )). Then the
mean dynamics in (21) can be written as
f˙m,n(T ) = Qm,n(f(T ))(1− fm,n(T ))fm,n(T )
− fm,n(T )
∑
i 6=m
Qi,n(f(T ))fi,n(T )
=fm,n(T )
(
Qm,n(f(T ))−
M∑
i=1
Qi,n(f(T ))fi,n(T )
)
,
which completes the proof.
8.3 Proof of Theorem 6
We first denote the following function
Φ(f(T )) = E[
M∑
i=1
∫ xi(T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz|f(T )],
and
Φm,n(f(T )) = E[
M∑
i=1
∫ xi(T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz|an(T ) = m,f(T )].
Obviously, we have
Φ(f(T )) =
M∑
m=1
Φm,n(f(T ))fm,n(T ).
We further denote x−n(T ) , (x−nm (T ),m ∈M) as the
population state of all other users without user n. By
considering the user distributions on the chosen channel
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m by user n and the other channels, we then have
Φm,n(f(T ))
=E[
M∑
i=1
∫ xi(T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz|an(T ) = m,f(T )]
=
∑
x−n(T )
E[
∑
i6=m
∫ x−ni (T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz
+
∫ x−nm (T )+ 1N
−∞
θmBmg(Nz)dz|an(T ) = m,x−n(T )]
× Pr{x−n(T )|f(T )}
=
∑
x−n(T )
∑
i 6=m
∫ x−ni (T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz
+
∫ x−nm (T )+ 1N
−∞
θmBmg(Nz)dz
)
Pr{x−n(T )|f(T )}.
(22)
Similarly, we can obtain
Φm′,n(f(T )) =
∑
x−n(T )
∑
i 6=m′
∫ x−ni (T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz
+
∫ x−n
m′ (T )+
1
N
−∞
θm′Bm′g(Nz)dz
)
Pr{x−n(T )|f(T )}.
(23)
It follows that
Φm,n(f(T ))− Φm′,n(f(T ))
=
∑
x−n(T )
∑
i 6=m
∫ x−ni (T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz
+
∫ x−nm (T )+ 1N
−∞
θmBmg(Nz)dz
)
Pr{x−n(T )|f(T )}
−
∑
x−n(T )
∑
i 6=m′
∫ x−ni (T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz
+
∫ x−n
m′ (T )+
1
N
−∞
θm′Bm′g(Nz)dz
)
Pr{x−n(T )|f(T )}
=
∑
x−n(T )
(∫ x−nm (T )+ 1N
−∞
θmBmg(Nz)dz
−
∫ x−nm (T )
−∞
θmBmg(Nz)
)
Pr{x−n(T )|f(T )}
−
∑
x−n(T )
(∫ x−n
m′ (T )+
1
N
−∞
θm′Bm′g(Nz)dz
−
∫ x−n
m′ (T )
−∞
θm′Bm′g(Nz)
)
Pr{x−n(T )|f(T )}. (24)
Since N is large, we obtain that for i ∈ {m,m′}∫ x−ni (T )+ 1N
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz −
∫ x−ni (T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)
=
∫ x−ni (T )+ 1N
x−ni (T )
θiBig(Nz)dz =
∫ Nx−ni (T )+1
Nx−ni (T )
θiBig(z)dz
≈θiBig(Nx−ni (T ) + 1). (25)
According to (24) and (25), we have
Φm,n(f(T ))− Φm′,n(f(T ))
=
∑
x−n(T )
(
θmBmg(Nx
−n
m (T ) + 1)
− θm′Bm′g(Nx−nm′ (T ) + 1)
)
Pr{x−n(T )|f(T )}
=E[Un(an = m,x(t))|f(T )]− E[Un(an = m′,x(t))|f(T )]
=Qm,n(f(T ))−Qm′,n(f(T )). (26)
We then consider the variation of Φ(f(T )) along the
trajectories of learning dynamics in (14), i.e., differenti-
ating Φ(f(T )) with respective to time T ,
dΦ(f(T ))
dT
=
M∑
m=1
dΦ(f(T ))
dfm,n(T )
dfm,n(T )
dT
=
M∑
m=1
Φm,n(f(T ))fm,n(T )
×
(
Qm,n(f(T ))−
M∑
i=1
fi,n(T )Qi,n(f(T ))
)
=
1
2
M∑
m=1
M∑
i=1
fm,n(T )fi,n(T )
× (Qm,n(f(T ))−Qi,n(f(T ))) (Φm,n(f(T ))− Φi,n(f(T )))
=
1
2
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
fi,n(T )fj,n(T ) (Qi,n(f(T ))−Qj,n(f(T )))2
≥0. (27)
Hence Φ(f(T )) is non-decreasing along the trajectories
of the ODE (14). According to Theorem 2.7 in [26], the
learning mechanism asymptotically converges to a limit
point f∗ such that
dΦ(f∗)
dT
= 0, (28)
i.e., for any m, i ∈M, n ∈ N
f∗m,nf
∗
i,n (Qm,n(f
∗)−Qi,n(f∗)) = 0. (29)
According to the mixed strategy update in (11), we know
that fm,n(T ) > 0 for any m ∈ M. Thus, from (29), we
must have Qm,n(f∗) = Qi,n(f∗).
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